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When is it socially advantageous for legal rules to be changed in the light of altered circumstances?
In answering this basic question here, a simple point is developed -- that past compliance with legal
rules tends to reduce the social advantages of legal change. The reasons are twofold: adjusting to a
new legal rule often involves costs; and the social benefits of change are frequently only incremental,
only in addition to those of past compliance. The general implications are that legal rules should be
more stable than would be appropriate were the relevance of past behavior not recognized, and that
a policy of grandfathering, namely, of permitting noncompliance, should sometimes be employed.
The analysis of these points has broad relevance, applying across legal fields, often explaining what
we observe but also indicating possibilities for reform, such as in the regulation of air pollution. The
analysis is related to the conventional reliance-based justification for the stability of the law, the literature
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Abstract:  When is it socially advantageous for legal rules to be changed in the 
light of altered circumstances?  In answering this basic question here, a simple point is 
developed – that past compliance with legal rules tends to reduce the social advantages of 
legal change.  The reasons are twofold: adjusting to a new legal rule often involves costs; 
and the social benefits of change are frequently only incremental, only in addition to 
those of past compliance.  The general implications are that legal rules should be more 
stable than would be appropriate were the relevance of past behavior not recognized, and 
that a policy of grandfathering, namely, of permitting noncompliance, should sometimes 
be employed.  The analysis of these points has broad relevance, applying across legal 
fields, often explaining what we observe but also indicating possibilities for reform, such 
as in the regulation of air pollution.  The analysis is related to the conventional reliance-
based justification for the stability of the law, the literature on legal transitions, and 
economic writing on optimal legal standards.   
 




  The object of this article is to examine a primary question about legal rules, 
namely, when is it desirable for legal rules to be modified in the light of new 
circumstances?  The major contribution of the article is its identification and elaboration 
of the point that parties’ past compliance with legal rules may reduce the net social 
advantages of legal change.  The general implications are that legal rules should be more 
stable than would apparently be appropriate, that is, appropriate were past behavior not 
taken into account, and also that a policy of grandfathering – of allowing noncompliance 
for parties already participating in an activity and complying with rules in the past
1 – 
should often be employed. 
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1 This general meaning of  “grandfathering” will be employed below.  For standard definitions of 
“grandfather clause,” see BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 718 (8th ed. 2004) (“A provision that creates an 
exemption from the law’s effect for something that existed before the law’s effective date.”); MERRIAM 
WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 507 (10th ed. 1993) (“[A] clause creating an exemption based on 
circumstances previously existing.”).  The word “grandfathering” and its cognates are widely used, 
although they do not usually appear in the language of statutes.    
  1    The kernel of the argument to be developed is easily appreciated.  Consider a firm 
that installed a type of smoke scrubber which satisfied pollution control rules five years 
ago when the firm built a factory.  Suppose that advances in technology have resulted in 
the availability of a new type of smoke scrubber that is superior to the old: the new 
scrubber reduces pollution even more and it is cheaper to purchase and operate.  
Should there be a change in the legal rule requiring the firm to use the new type of 
smoke scrubber in its factory?  Quite possibly not, and for two reasons.  First, the social 
costs of a change would be distinctly positive – the firm would have to purchase the new 
scrubber, and the firm would often bear various adjustment costs as well (it would have 
to remove the old scrubber and it might have to engage in retrofitting to accommodate the 
new scrubber).  Second, the social benefits of a change would be only incremental, for if 
the old scrubber were kept, it would reduce pollution to a certain degree.  If the costs 
associated with a change to the new scrubber would outweigh the incremental social 
benefits, it would be socially best to permit the firm to continue to use the old scrubber. 
In contrast, if a firm were building a factory afresh, the firm should obviously be 
required to install the new smoke scrubber.  The new scrubber costs less than the old type 
and the social benefits that the new scrubber would yield would be total, not incremental, 
because by hypothesis there would be no existing factory that would already have 
installed a scrubber of some type.  
This simple example illustrates the conclusion that it may be socially 
advantageous to grandfather a party that complied with a legal rule in the past, even 
though the rule should be altered for new participants in the activity.
2   
A closely related conclusion applies when it is impractical for the legal system to 
treat new participants and past participants differently, in other words, when 
grandfathering is infeasible.  In that case, if a legal rule is altered, those for whom a 
change would be socially wasteful cannot be grandfathered, resulting in inefficiency.  
Hence, it will often be desirable for the law to remain stable, until the inefficiency of 
forced change for many parties who complied with the law in the past is outweighed by 
the benefits of change in regard to others.  
These conclusions about the importance of prior behavior to the calculus 
governing the desirability of legal change, of grandfathering, and of legal stability have 
very broad applicability, as they do not depend on the area of law.  
However, two qualifications to the analysis will be noted.  The first is that past 
behavior matters only when it is of a durable nature (a smoke scrubber may last for 
years).  When instead past behavior concerns nondurable, modifiable effort (such as the 
frequency of inspection of toxic waste-containing tanks for leaks), legal rules should not 
depend on past behavior and thus should be adjusted in response to all manner of changes 
in conditions.     
The second qualification is that legal rules should reflect past behavior only when 
the rules are based on legal standards (notably, regulatory standards or due care standards 
used in applying the negligence rule).  When instead legal rules are premised on strict 
liability, parties will automatically be induced to take past behavior into account in a 
socially appropriate manner.  Hence, under strict liability, there is no basis for 
                                                 
2 A similar argument to that of the example demonstrates that it may be desirable to grandfather a 
party who participated in an activity in the past when there was no legal rule (rather than a less rigorous 
rule) applying to the activity at the time.  See infra section 3.4.   
  2grandfathering, such as for cabining damages to reflect an earlier anticipated level of 
harm.   
The organization of the article is as follows.  In section 2, I develop theoretically 
the main argument that I have just described.  To this end, I examine informally a stylized 
model of precautions that reduce the risk of harm.  There are two periods in the model.  
In the first, uncertainty exists about the harmfulness of the activity or about the cost or 
technology of risk-reduction.  In the second period, the uncertainty has been resolved – 
information about the magnitude of harm that the activity might cause and/or about new 
opportunities for risk-reduction has become available.  This information may or may not 
make it socially desirable for the level of precaution to change.  The implications of the 
desirability or undesirability of change in the level of precautions for the stability of legal 
rules and for grandfathering are considered.  
In section 3 I study the role in the model of a number of logically secondary, but 
sometimes empirically important, factors, including maintenance costs, the scrap value of 
equipment, transition costs, and modification of property.  I also address informational 
problems that confront legal authorities and I discuss legal policy when grandfathering is 
too administratively difficult to accomplish. 
In section 4, I present a formal version of the model. 
In section 5, I comment on the law in the light of the analysis.  I first ask whether 
legal rules do, as an approximate matter, exhibit a measure of stability where the analysis 
suggests that they ought, which is to say, where parties’ actions have durable aspects and 
they are subject to legal standards.  I then consider grandfathering.  I note that 
grandfathering can be seen as a general, though implicit, feature of the negligence 
determination in tort law.  I also survey two contexts in which explicit grandfathering is a 
prominent feature – regulation of air pollution from power plants and real estate zoning – 
and I consider how well their characteristics conform to the theory of optimal 
grandfathering.  I suggest that although the observed grandfathering rules appear to be 
rational in a rough qualitative sense, the rules sometimes appear to suffer from substantial 
defects.  Notably, the grandfathering of out-of-date power plants is problematic, mainly 
because it is of long duration and permits old, highly-polluting plants to be maintained 
and modified significantly yet still to remain grandfathered.  
In section 6, I discuss several views found in commentary and scholarly writing 
about legal change and relate them to the analysis of this article.  One view concerns the 
notion that legal rules ought to be relatively stable because individuals rely on the rules.
3  
I find this view consistent with the argument given here for legal stability, but incorrect if 
premised on the idea that participation in activities would be undesirably chilled by 
called-for legal change.  Another view is found in the economically-oriented literature on 
“legal transitions,” the major claim of which is that grandfathering is often socially 
                                                 
3 See, e.g., Landgraf v. USI Film Prod., 511 U.S. 244, 265–66, 114 S. Ct. 1483, 1497 (1994) 
(“Elementary considerations of fairness dictate that individuals should have an opportunity to know what 
the law is and to conform their conduct accordingly; settled expectations should not be lightly disrupted. . . 
.  In a free, dynamic society, creativity in both commercial and artistic endeavors is fostered by a rule of 
law that gives people confidence about the legal consequences of their actions.”); Developments in the Law 
– Zoning, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1427, 1494–96 (1978) (discussing property holders’ reliance interests in the 
context of zoning); Hochman (1960) at 727 (emphasizing reliance as the major factor in statutory 
retroactivity cases).  
 
  3disadvantageous.
4  This claim holds only if liability is strict.  If, as is usually true, 
however, liability is based on fault or a regulatory standard, the claim of the transitions 
literature appears to be misleading, because it is patent that grandfathering may have a 
desirable role to play.
5  I then comment on prior, economic literature on legal rules and 
incentives.  This literature does not address the question of the relevance of past behavior 
to later optimal behavior and to optimal change in rules. 
In section 7, I briefly conclude.   
 
2. A Model of Optimal Legal Change    
2.1 Assumptions.  In the standard model of potentially harm-creating activity, a 
party chooses a level of precaution in order to reduce the likelihood of harm.
6  As 
indicated above, I will consider a two period version of the model, and I will suppose that 
some parties engage in the activity in both periods whereas others enter the activity only 
in the second period. 
Two alternative assumptions will be made about precautions.  Precautions may be 
durable, notably, involve the acquisition of a safety device, such as the smoke scrubber 
mentioned above, or relate to fixed physical aspects of property, such as the number and 
location of exits from a building (but see the next section on the interpretation of durable 
precautions) or its setback from a boundary line.  It will be assumed that if a party invests 
in a durable precaution in period 1, the party can benefit from it in period 2 without 
additional cost.
7  If, however, a durable precaution is changed in period 2 from what it 
was in period 1, a cost, that of the new precaution, will be incurred.  For example, if a 
smoke scrubber of type A is purchased in period 1 and it is replaced by a smoke scrubber 
of type B in period 2, the cost of the type B smoke scrubber will be borne in period 2.  If 
scrubber A is replaced by scrubber B, the total cost of precautions over the two periods 
will thus be the cost of scrubber A plus the cost of scrubber B, but if scrubber A is used 
over both periods, the total cost of precautions will be just that of scrubber A.  
Precautions may instead be nondurable.  Typically, nondurable precautions take 
the form of effort to reduce risk, such as the example from the Introduction of the 
frequency of inspection of a holding tank for leaks, or the care taken in driving.  It is 
natural to assume that an effort to reduce risk requires the bearing of a cost each period 
the effort is made, and further that the cost of effort in period 2 is independent of the 
                                                 
4 See especially Graetz (1977), Kaplow (1986), and Shaviro (2000).  
 
5 But to be clear, the conclusions of the transitions literature are not misleading, and have 
relevance, in the area of taxation, to which the literature was originally addressed.  The reason is that tax 
rules can often be viewed as a species of, or analogous to, strict liability rules, rather than rules requiring 
compliance with legal standards.  See infra section 6. 
 
6 See, e.g., Brown (1973), and more generally, Landes and Posner (1987) and Shavell (1987).  In 
some versions of the standard model, the exercise of precautions affects not only the likelihood of harm but 
also its magnitude.  This difference is inessential for my purposes, and for simplicity I examine here a 
model in which only the likelihood of harm is affected by the level of precautions.    
  
7 The assumption that a durable precaution can be enjoyed in period 2 without any additional cost 
is made for simplicity.  I relax the assumption in section 3 infra, and allow for the possibility that a 
maintenance cost must be incurred in period 2 to continue to benefit from the precaution.   
 
  4effort made in period 1.  The presumption, for instance, is that the cost of inspecting 
holding tanks with a frequency of three times a week in year 2 is independent of the 
frequency of inspection of the tanks in year 1.  Hence, the cost of nondurable precautions 
taken in the two periods is assumed to be simply the cost of the precaution taken in 
period 1 plus the cost of the precaution taken in period 2.   
Another assumption that I make is that there is uncertainty at the outset about how 
harmful the activity is or about the cost or the technology of risk reduction.  By the 
beginning of period 2, however, the uncertainty is resolved – the nature of the harmful 
activity or about opportunities for risk reduction is learned.  For concreteness, one might 
imagine that at the beginning of period 1, it is thought that the harm from the activity 
could turn out to be anywhere in the range between $100,000 and $1,000,000; and by the 
beginning of period 2, the true magnitude of the harm will become known (perhaps 
because an accident will occur and reveal the harm).
8  Or one might have in mind a 
situation such that at the beginning of period 1, it is thought that a technological advance 
could occur, and if so, would result in a risk-reducing device that would be twice as 
effective as present devices and cost the same; and by the beginning of period 2, whether 
the new device will be available will be known.  The importance of the assumption that 
uncertainty is resolved by the beginning of period 2 is that it may then become desirable 
for precautions and the law to change in the light of the new information and 
circumstances.    
2.2 The interpretation of durable and nondurable precautions.  Although in 
the model the assumption is that the effect of a durable precaution on risk in period 2 is 
identical to its effect in period 1, it will be apparent that the qualitative character of the 
conclusions to be reached would be similar as long as the precautions taken in period 1 
have some effect on risk or harm in period 2.  Hence, a durable precaution should be 
viewed broadly, as essentially any action that influences the probability or magnitude of 
harm beyond the period 1.
9
The taking of durable precautions may sometimes be an implicit aspect of 
compliance with a legal rule.  For example, suppose that a factory is required to use 
natural gas as a fuel for its power plant (say because the alternative of coal would 
generate substantial pollution).  The burning of gas does not itself constitute a durable 
precaution, but it may well be associated with such: the factory might have purchased a 
kind of furnace best suited to burn natural gas, it might have installed a pipe connecting 
the main gas line to its power plant, and it might have chosen its location in order to be 
assured of a steady supply of gas.  These decisions have durable aspects because they 
allow the factory to continue to use natural gas more cheaply in the future. 
Another comment about the generality of the notion of durable precautions 
concerns training and intellectual capital, and also investments in the use of particular 
financial arrangements and reporting practices.  If an organization trains its employees to 
undertake a specific risk-lowering task, say an airline teaches its mechanics to overhaul a 
                                                 
8 To amplify, the activity is assumed always to cause just one level of harm if an accident occurs. 
What that level is not known in the beginning of period 1, but it is known by the beginning of period 2. 
 
9 See infra section 3 and also section 4.5 on variations of the simple assumption that a durable 
precaution has the same effect in period 2 as it did in period 1.  
 
  5kind of aircraft engine according to a set procedure, then the training investment is a form 
of intellectual capital that has a durable aspect in that it yields benefits every time a 
trained employee undertakes the task.  Likewise, organizations and individuals often 
make particular financial and contractual arrangements and collect and organize data to 
satisfy regulatory demands (consider, for instance, how retirement plans must be 
established, maintained, and reported on to satisfy ERISA regulations).  These legal 
compliance efforts are substantial, in that they involve learning, the establishment of 
procedures, legal services, and the like, and they have a durable dimension in that they 
can continue to be employed after they are made. 
In respect to nondurable precautions, the main interpretive observation worth 
making is that not only effort, but also a physical resource that is consumed within a 
period should be viewed as an example.  The use of a windshield wiper blade might be 
considered a nondurable precaution, assuming that the length of the relevant period 
exceeds the life of the wiper blade, for then a different kind of blade could be employed 
in the next period, and its cost would not depend on that of the prior blade.  
2.3 Socially optimal behavior.  In order to ascertain how well legal rules 
function and how they ought to be designed, socially optimal behavior must be 
delineated.  I will usually employ as a social welfare criterion the analytically convenient 
objective of minimizing social costs, namely, the costs of precautions over the two 
periods plus the expected harm done.  This social goal reflects the notion that precautions 
as well as harms are socially expensive, so that precautions should be taken only if they 
accomplish sufficient good in reducing harm.
10   
Given this social objective, what is socially ideal behavior?  Let us begin by 
reviewing the standard one period model of harm and precaution.  In this model, the best 
level of precaution, which I well refer to as the conventionally optimal level of 
precaution, minimizes the cost of precaution plus the expected harm in the single period 
at issue.  Thus, if the question is which is better, no precaution or a particular, named 
precaution, the answer is simple:  If the cost of the precaution is less than the reduction in 
the expected harm it brings about, the precaution should be taken.  If the cost of the 
precaution is $1,000 and it lowers the risk of a $500,000 harm from 10% to 8%, it lowers 
the expected harm by 2%x$500,000 = $10,000, so it is worth taking.
11  More generally, 
the question may be which precaution to take among an array of different precautions, 
and the possible precautions might constitute a continuum.  To determine the optimal 
level of precautions in this context, one can conceive of deciding how much to spend on 
precautions by asking whether, by spending another dollar, the expected harm would be 
                                                 
10 Were I to consider other social goals, such as compensation of victims of harm, the qualitative 
conclusions would not be altered, for they depend mainly on there being a cost-saving advantage to 
maintaining durable precautions.  Inclusion of social goals in addition to those I study would only cloud the 
analysis, even though in reality of course the social objective is more broad than minimization of social 
costs as defined here. 
 
11 As in this illustration, the expected harm means probability-discounted harm.  That the expected 
harm is included in social costs means that society displays “risk-neutrality” with respect to harm rather 
than “risk-aversion.”  I make the assumption that society and, below, that decision makers, are risk-neutral 
mainly for analytical convenience.  On the concepts of risk-neutrality and risk-aversion, see, e.g., Pindyck 
and Rubinfeld (2001) at 155-160 and Shavell (1987) at ch. 8. 
  
  6reduced by more than a dollar; as long as the answer to this question is yes, the extra 
dollar should be spent.  At a certain point, though, spending another dollar will not be 
worthwhile, since the effectiveness of precautions will have fallen to just less than a 
dollar; at this point, the optimal expenditure on precautions will have been reached.  In 
general, the more harmful an activity is, the higher will be the optimal level of 
precautions, and the optimal level of precautions will rise in a more or less continuous 
fashion with the expected harmfulness of an activity. 
 Now let us consider the two period model with uncertainty surrounding the level 
of harm
12 and let us first study the case of nondurable precautions, because it is the easier 
case to understand.  Here the cost of precautions is independent in each period, so we can 
view the periods separately.  Because in the beginning of period 2 the level of harm that 
would occur in an accident is assumed to be known, the optimal level of precaution will 
be whatever is conventionally optimal for that level of harm.  If the level of harm were an 
accident to occur turns out to be $200,000, then the precaution taken in period 2 ought to 
be appropriate for a $200,000 potential harm, if the level of harm turns out to be 
$600,000, then the precaution taken in period 2 ought to be suitably higher, and so 
forth.
13  In the beginning of period 1, however, the level of harm that would result from 
an accident is not known, so that the level of precaution should reflect this uncertainty.  
In the model, it is readily shown that the optimal level of precaution in period 1 equals 
the level that would be appropriate for the expected harm given that harm occurs.  For 
instance, if the harm is equally likely to be anywhere in the range between $100,000 and 
$1,000,000, then the expected harm conditional on its occurrence is the midpoint of this 
range namely, $550,000, so the precaution taken in period 1 should be that which is 
optimal for a potential harm of $550,000.
14  
We can summarize as follows.  In the case of nondurable precautions, the optimal 
period 1 level of precaution is the conventionally optimal level for the expected harm.  
The optimal period 2 level of precautions is the conventionally optimal level for the then 
known harm, whatever that may be.  Thus, the optimal period 2 level of precaution is 
generally different from the optimal period 1 level.  Note as well that the optimal level of 
precaution for a party who first enters the activity in period 2 is the same as the optimal 
level of precaution in period 2 for a party who had engaged in the activity in period 1.  
Next let us turn to the case of durable precautions and let us again begin by 
considering what is best for a party in period 2.  I want to show that the party should not 
change its precaution from what the precaution was in period 1 unless the harm turns out 
to be sufficiently high.
15  To illustrate, suppose in period 1 that a party took the 
                                                 
12 The case in which uncertainty concerns the cost (or technology) of risk-reduction is similar, as I 
will occasionally remark in notes below.  
 
13 Likewise, in the case where uncertainty attaches to the cost of risk reduction and it turns out to 
be inexpensive to reduce risk, then the level of precaution ought to be suitably higher. 
 
14 For simplicity, I will often refer below to the expected harm conditional on harm occurring 
(here $550,000) simply as the expected harm, even though the unconditional expected harm equals the 
probability of harm occurring multiplied by the expected harm conditional on its occurrence. 
  
15 In the case where uncertainty attaches to the cost of risk reduction, the analogue is that it is best 
for the party not to change its precaution from the period 1 level unless the cost of risk reduction turns out 
to be sufficiently low. 
  7precaution of buying a safety device that lowered the risk of harm to 7%.  Assume that 
the harm in period 2 turns out to be $700,000, that the conventionally optimal precaution 
for harm of $700,000 involves a cost of $20,000, and that that precaution would lower 
risk to 5%.  Should this new precaution be taken?  If it is not taken and the period 1 
safety device continues to be employed, the risk will remain at 7%, so the expected harm 
will be 7%x$700,000 = $49,000, but no added cost of precaution will be incurred.  If 
instead the new, conventionally optimal precaution is taken, an added cost of $20,000 
will be borne, implying that social costs in period 2 will be $20,000 + 5%x$700,000 = 
$55,000, which is higher than $49,000.  Hence, the new conventionally optimal 
precaution should not be taken – the party should stand pat with the original period 1 
precaution.  One way of understanding this conclusion is to observe that the cost of a 
change in precaution is $20,000, whereas the benefit is only due to the marginal effect of 
the 2% drop in risk (that is, 7% – 5%) on expected losses, 2%x$700,000 = $14,000, 
which is less.  If, though, the harm were sufficiently high, then it would be worthwhile 
changing to the conventionally optimal precaution.  For example, suppose that the harm 
is discovered to be $900,000 and that the conventionally optimal precaution for this harm 
costs $22,000 and lowers the risk to 4%.  Then if the period 1 precaution is maintained, 
social costs will be 7%x$900,000 = $63,000, whereas if the precaution is changed to the 
new conventionally optimal level, social costs will be $22,000 + 4%x$900,000 = 
$58,000, so that it will be best for the party to change to the conventionally optimal level 
of precaution.  Here the $22,000 is worth spending because the marginal reduction in risk 
of 3% (that is, 7% – 4%) is justified by the high potential harm, for 3%x$900,000 = 
$27,000.   
We can summarize and generalize as follows.  In the case of durable precautions, 
a party ought to continue with its period 1 precaution in period 2 if the cost of the new 
conventionally optimal precaution for period 2 harm would exceed the marginal 
reduction in expected harm that would be accomplished by a change to this precaution.
16  
Hence, it is socially desirable for a party to maintain its period 1 precaution in period 2 
as long as the known harm turns out to fall below a threshold; otherwise, the party 
should change its precaution to the conventionally optimal level for the known harm.       
Consider now the best level of precaution in the beginning of period 1.  At that 
time, the harmfulness of the activity is not known, and one might think that the optimal 
level of precautions is the conventionally optimal level for the expected harm, namely, 
the conventionally optimal level of harm for harm of $550,000 in our example.  (This 
                                                                                                                                                 
  
16 This conclusion can be expressed algebraically (see section 4 infra for details).  Let p(x1) be the 
probability of harm resulting from the expenditure on precaution x1 made in period 1 and let x*(h) be the 
conventionally optimal precaution expenditure when harm is known to be h (that is, x*(h) is the x that 
minimizes x + p(x)h).  Then if there is no change in precaution in period 2, social costs are p(x1)h, whereas 
if precaution is changed to the conventionally optimal level, social costs in period 2 are x*(h) + p(x*(h))h.  
Hence, it is best not to change precaution as long as p(x1)h <  x*(h) + p(x*(h))h, or equivalently, x*(h) > 
[p(x1) – p(x*(h))]h.   
Similarly, in the case where there is uncertainty about the cost of risk-reduction rather than h, let c 
be the cost of a unit of precaution, assume that c = 1 in period 1, let the uncertain c in period 2 become 
known at the beginning of period 2, and let x*(c) be the number of units of precaution x that minimize cx + 
p(x)h.  Then it is best not to change precaution as long as p(x1)h <  cx*(c) + p(x*(c))h, or equivalently, 
cx*(c) > [p(x1) – p(x*(c))]h. 
 
  8level was optimal, recall, in the case of nondurable precautions.)  However, in the case of 
durable precautions, the optimal level of period 1 precaution is higher than the 
conventionally optimal level for the expected harm.  The essential reason is that because 
precautions are durable, when precautions are taken in period 1, it will often be best not 
to alter them in period 2, as described in the previous paragraph.  This in turn means that 
the social payoff from risk reduction flowing from period 1 precaution may extend to 
period 2 and thus raises the optimal investment in period 1 precaution (above what it 
would be in the case of nondurable precaution).   
Last, consider what is socially optimal for a party entering into the activity only in 
period 2, so that it will be participating in the activity just that period.  The party should 
take the conventionally optimal level of precautions that is appropriate for the level of 
harm, which is known, as the model that applies to the party is in effect just the standard 
one period model.  In particular, what is optimal for the party is different from what is 
optimal for a party who engaged in the activity the first period, because for that party, as 
has been emphasized, it is optimal to maintain first period precaution unless the harm is 
sufficiently high.  For example, what might be optimal for those parties who engage in 
the activity both periods is to choose period 1 precautions equal to the conventionally 
optimal level for harm of $600,000 and to maintain period 1 precaution in period 2 unless 
the harm turns out to exceed $800,000, in which case it is optimal for them to take the 
conventionally optimal precaution for the level of harm that is observed.  But those 
parties only entering the activity in period 2 should always take the conventionally 
optimal precaution for the level of harm that eventuates.  Hence, if the harm is between 
$600,000 and $800,000, it is optimal for those entering the activity in period 2 to take 
greater precautions than those who had engaged in the activity the previous period.
17  
2.4 Strict liability.  Having described socially optimal behavior in the two 
periods, I now consider how it can be achieved.  Under strict liability parties pay for the 
harm that they cause, whatever the harm turns out to be.
18  It is evident that, because a 
party bears the full social costs of its decisions under strict liability, the party will make 
all of its decisions in a socially optimal way.  In particular, the party will choose optimal 
precautions each period that it engages in the activity, whether the precautions are 
durable or nondurable.
19  For instance, if precautions are durable, the party will only 
change precaution in period 2 if the harm is sufficiently large; for if the harm is not very 
large, it will be cheaper for the party to bear higher expected liability payments than to 
reduce them by spending on the new conventionally optimal precaution.  
As a corollary to what was just observed, we can say that there should be no 
grandfathering under strict liability.  In the context of strict liability, the interpretation of 
                                                 
17 Observe also that if harm turns out to be less than $600,000, those entering the activity should in 
principle take precautions that are lower than those that engaged in the activity the first period.  This makes 
sense because, not having invested in a higher level of precautions, those entering the activity should take a 
level of precautions that reflects only the known harm in period 2. 
  
18 In the model I abstract from contributory behavior of victims for simplicity, and hence I do not 
consider strict liability with a defense of contributory negligence. 
 
19 This conclusion also holds under a corrective tax, such as a pollution tax, that is set equal to the 
expected harm that a party generates.   
  
  9grandfathering is some kind of insulation from liability in period 2 for parties who 
participated in the activity in period 1, notably, limiting the magnitude of damages to the 
harm that was foreseen in period 1, even if the harm turned out to be higher in period 2.  
Such grandfathering under strict liability is not only unnecessary to induce optimal 
precautions, but it also could be socially undesirable because it could dilute incentives to 
take these precautions.   
2.5 Negligence or regulatory standards.  Under the negligence rule or a 
regulatory standard, parties are required to adhere to a level of precaution that the state 
chooses.  I will assume here that parties comply with the required level of precaution 
owing to the threat of liability for negligence or of penalties for violation of regulatory 
standards.  Hence, the question to be addressed is how legal standards ought to be set, 
and the answer is simply that the standards ought to equal the optimal levels of 
precaution described above. 
Accordingly, from what we concluded in section 2.3, we have the following.  If 
precautions are nondurable, the best standard in period 1 is the conventionally optimal 
level of precaution for the expected harm, and the best standard in period 2 generally is 
different and equals the optimal level of precaution for the then known harm.  
Grandfathering is not optimal. 
However, if precautions are durable, the best standard in period 1 exceeds the 
level of precaution that would be appropriate for the expected harm, and grandfathering 
may be desirable.  If in period 2 the known harm is below a threshold, grandfathering is 
optimal – parties who engaged in the activity in period 1 can maintain their period 1 
precaution – but parties who enter the activity in period 2 should take the conventionally 
optimal precaution for the known harm.  If in period 2 the known harm exceeds the 
threshold, then parties who engaged in the activity in period 1 should change their 
precaution to the conventionally optimal precaution for the harm, which is the precaution 
that new parties should take. 
  
3. Extensions of the Model  
  I now want to consider briefly a number of factors to add greater realism to the 
model.  I will focus on the case of central interest, that of durable precautions where legal 
rules set out negligence or regulatory standards.    
3.1 Maintenance cost.  It was assumed above that if a party employed its period 
1 precaution in period 2, the party would bear no additional cost.  But there is often a 
maintenance cost that must be incurred to continue to use a durable precaution, such as 
the cost of keeping a safety device in good repair or the cost of operating it.  Because the 
bearing of a maintenance cost makes retaining the period 1 precaution less attractive, the 
social desirability of continuing to use the period 1 precaution in period 2, and of 
grandfathering, is reduced.  In the illustration where the period 2 level of harm turns out 
to be $700,000 and grandfathering is optimal, suppose that a maintenance cost of $9,000 
must be incurred to continue use of the period 1 precaution.  Then if that is done, the 
precaution-associated cost in period 2 will be $9,000, whereas if the new precaution is 
taken, the cost will be $20,000.  Hence, the net cost of a change to the new precaution 
would be only $11,000, whereas the marginal reduction in expected harm would be 
$14,000, which is greater, so that grandfathering would not be desirable.  This illustrates 
the point that, given maintenance costs, grandfathering is optimal only when the cost of a 
  10new precaution minus maintenance costs associated with the period 1 precaution exceeds 
the marginal reduction in expected harm that would be accomplished by the change in the 
precaution. 
 3.2 Scrap value.  Another assumption that was made above was that, if a party 
invested in a durable precaution in period 1 but then changed to a different precaution in 
period 2, its cost of precautions over the two periods was the sum of the costs of both.  
This assumption would be appropriate where a durable precaution is a safety device for 
which the party would obtain no value if the party were to change to a new device in 
period 2.  However, in some circumstances, the party would obtain value for the period 1 
device by selling it on a second-hand market or by using it elsewhere for some purpose.  
To the degree that the party can obtain such a scrap value for the period 1 device, the 
social cost of changing the precaution falls.  Hence, the social desirability of continuing 
to use the period 1 precaution in period 2, and of grandfathering, diminishes.  To 
illustrate in the example, I had said that if the new level of harm in period 2 turns out to 
be $700,000, grandfathering is desirable, for the cost of the new precaution is $20,000 
whereas the reduction in expected harm if there is a change to a new precaution is less, 
$14,000.  However, suppose that the old precaution has a scrap value of $10,000.  Then 
the cost of a switch to the new precaution net of scrap value is $20,000 – $10,000 = 
$10,000, which is less than $14,000, so that a change in precaution would be desirable 
and grandfathering would not be optimal.  In general, when there is scrap value, 
grandfathering is optimal only when the cost of the new precaution minus scrap value 
exceeds the marginal reduction in expected harm that would be accomplished by a 
change to the new precaution.  
 3.3 Transition cost.  An additional assumption that was made in section 2 was 
that changing to a new precaution would not involve any cost apart from that of the new 
precaution itself.  Yet in many instances there will be some kind of transition cost 
because, for instance, a safety device used in period 1 will have to be removed, repairs 
will have to be made where that device had been installed, or redesign may be needed to 
make use of a new safety device.  Such transition costs obviously enhance the social 
desirability of continuing to use period 1 durable precautions and thus of grandfathering. 
In the second illustration, where the harm learned in period 2 turns out to be $900,000, I 
had said that grandfathering was not desirable, as the cost of the new precaution was 
$22,000, whereas the marginal reduction in expected harm was higher, $27,000.  But if 
there is a transition cost of, say, $8,000, grandfathering would become socially 
advantageous, since the cost of the switch to the new precaution would effectively be 
$22,000 + $8,000 = $30,000, exceeding $27,000.  If there are transition costs, 
grandfathering is desirable whenever the cost of the new precaution plus transition costs 
exceeds the marginal reduction in expected harm that would be accomplished by the 
change in precaution. 
3.4 Grandfathering in the absence of earlier legal standards.  In the analysis 
of section 2 and in the examples that were discussed, it was socially desirable for parties 
to take positive precaution in period 1.  Furthermore, the argument for maintaining period 
1 precaution and for grandfathering depended upon the period 1 precaution being 
positive.  For if that were not so, if no precaution were taken in period 1, then the 
advantage of adopting a new period 2 precaution would be total, not marginal.  If a 
factory did not install any smoke scrubber in period 1, then the pollution reduction 
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addition to what another smoke scrubber already accomplished.  Hence, the factory 
would be in the same situation as a new factory; its optimal level of precaution would be 
the period 2 level and there ought not to be grandfathering. 
However, once we take into account the factor of transition cost just discussed, 
we can see that the basis for grandfathering is restored.  In particular, even if no 
precaution was taken in period 1, a party’s having participated in an activity in period 1 
may well imply that the party would have to incur a transition cost to undertake a period 
2 precaution.  For example, if a factory that was built in period 1 did not install any type 
of smoke scrubber, the factory might find it expensive to install a smoke scrubber in 
period 2 because that might require renovations.  In contrast, a factory that is to be built 
in period 2 and knows it must install a smoke scrubber can plan for that.  Hence, it might 
be optimal to grandfather, that is, to allow the factory built in period 1 to continue 
without any scrubber, but to require the new factory to install the scrubber.  This point is 
of some relevance because, in reality, we often observe grandfathering when, previously, 
no legal standard applied, rather than when a positive but weaker legal standard applied. 
3.5 Modification of property.  Now consider the possibility that parties might 
wish to modify their property for some privately beneficial reason.  A factory might want 
to engage in alterations in order to produce a new good, to make use of a new production 
technology that would lower its costs, to build a new employee cafeteria – the reasons for 
modifications are manifold.  A modification may affect, and often would lower, the 
transition costs accompanying a change in durable precautions.  Suppose, for example, 
that a factory must halt production in order to undertake renovations.  During that time, a 
safety device could conveniently be replaced with a new one – whereas if the factory 
were not shut down on account of renovations, replacing the safety device would itself 
require cessation of operations.  Hence, in this example, the modification would eliminate 
the transition cost of a halt of factory operations, for the halt would occur anyway.  
Another example is where factory modifications require the hiring of architects and 
engineers.  They might charge less to do the work needed for installing a new safety 
device than if that were their only task.  Against the background of such examples, let us 
assume that modification lowers transition costs.
20   
To the degree that modifications lower transition costs, modifications will lower 
the social desirability of continued use of the period 1 precaution and of grandfathering.  
To illustrate, we discussed in the example of the last subsection that, when transition 
costs are $8,000, grandfathering is desirable, for the cost of the new precaution plus the 
transition cost is then $30,000, exceeding the reduction in expected harm of $27,000 that 
the new precaution would bring about.  But suppose that a modification would lower 
transition costs to $1,000.  Then grandfathering would no longer be socially 
advantageous, for the cost of the new precaution plus transition costs would be only 
$23,000.  In general, when there is a modification, there should be no grandfathering 
                                                 
20 It is possible that modifications would affect factors apart from transition cost that are relevant 
to the desirability of changing durable precautions.  For example, scrap value could be affected by a 
modification (it might be easier to remove an old smoke scrubber, in order to sell it, if a factory is being 
renovated).  But transition cost seems to be the main affected factor, and in any case it would be 
straightforward to modify what I will say about modifications to take into account their different effects. 
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marginal reduction in expected harm.  
3.6 Imperfect information of the state.  Another factor that I have not yet 
considered concerns the information that the state (courts or a regulator) requires in order 
to determine optimal precautions and thus when grandfathering is desirable.  In the basic 
model of durable precaution, the state needs to know the cost of precautions and the 
reduction in expected harm that precautions bring about over both periods.  Further, when 
the extensions to the model are taken into account, the burden on the state becomes 
greater, as it needs to reckon maintenance cost, scrap value, transition cost, and the effect 
of modifications on transition cost.  
The state will inevitably suffer from at least some lack of information necessary 
to the calculation of optimal precautions.  As a consequence, it will often have to make 
decisions on the basis of estimates, perhaps of average characteristics of parties, leading 
to the possibility of error relative to ideal outcomes.  Suppose, for instance, that the state 
is not able to ascertain actual transition cost, so the state bases its grandfathering on 
average transition cost.  In particular, suppose that the state decides to grandfather 
because average transition cost is $15,000, which exceeds the threshold of $10,000 above 
which it is optimal to grandfather.  Then, if a particular firm happens to face low 
transition costs relative to the average, say its transition cost is $5,000, the firm would 
mistakenly be grandfathered by the state.  The social cost of such an error is that society 
forgoes the opportunity to lower expected harm by more than the cost of so doing.  Under 
a different scenario, a converse error could occur: a firm could be mistakenly required to 
change precautions rather than be grandfathered.  Suppose that average transition costs 
are $5,000 and the state decides to require all firms to change precautions but a particular 
firm faces unusually high transition costs, such as $20,000.  This firm ought to be 
grandfathered but would not be.  The social cost of this type of error is that society 
requires the expenditure of greater resources than it derives benefits through a reduction 
in expected harm. 
 3.7 Imperfect information of the state and modification.  I return here to the 
subject of modification and grandfathering because of its connection to imperfect 
information of the state.  To explain, suppose that the state cannot easily determine a 
party’s transition cost, meaning that the state cannot base grandfathering policy directly 
on transition cost.  The state might then take the level of modification expenditures to be 
an indirect indicator of transition cost for the reasons given in section 3.4.  In particular, 
the state might assume that the higher are modification expenditures, the lower are 
transition costs and thus the less likely grandfathering is to be optimal.  Under this view, 
the state might rationally decide that when a party’s modification expenditures surpass a 
threshold, grandfathering should no longer be permitted.  
Although a policy under which grandfathering status is lost if modification 
expenditures exceed a threshold may thus be good on the whole, it might sometimes 
result in errors relative to the ideal.  Suppose, for instance, that a factory loses its 
grandfathering privilege under the modification expenditure policy because it spends 
heavily on a new employee cafeteria, yet suppose that the expenditure on the cafeteria 
does not really lower the true transition cost associated with a change to a new, less 
polluting furnace and thus should not have resulted in a loss of grandfathering.  Or 
suppose that a factory does not lose its grandfathering status because it spends only 
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significantly lowered the true transition cost of a change to a new furnace and thus should 
have resulted in a loss of grandfathering.  These examples illustrate the possibility that 
because modification expenditures may be an imperfect proxy for transition cost 
reduction, which is what grandfathering status ought to reflect, it is possible for socially 
undesirable outcomes to occur when grandfathered status depends on modification 
expenditures. 
Another unwanted effect of a policy under which modification expenditures may 
result in loss of grandfathering is the socially undesirable curtailment of modifications.  
The reason is that under the policy, parties have an incentive to keep modification 
expenditures below the threshold at which they would lose grandfathering status, even 
though it might be efficient for them to spend more on modifications.  Consider the 
example just mentioned of a factory that could build an employee cafeteria.  The cafeteria 
might be very beneficial for the employees and thus be desirable to add, yet the factory 
might well not build the cafeteria if that would mean it would sacrifice its grandfathered 
status.   
The detrimental curtailment of modification expenditures together with the 
problem of erroneous grandfathering decisions constitute implicit costs of the policy 
under which the degree of modification expenditures determines grandfathering status.  
Of course, these costs do not mean that the policy is inadvisable, but they do suggest that 
there might be significant value in obtaining direct information about transition costs 
rather than relying upon the proxy of modification expenditures. 
3.8 Second-best legal change in the absence of grandfathering.  
Grandfathering involves administrative costs, for it requires the state to determine 
whether, or for how long, parties have participated in an activity and have complied with 
legal rules.  Moreover, the problems described in the last two sections diminish the social 
value of grandfathering.  In view of these administrative costs and problems, it may be 
best for the state not to engage in grandfathering and thus simply to change the law or not 
to do so for all parties, without inquiry into their past participation in activities and their 
compliance with legal rules.  
Under the assumption that the state does not grandfather, its best decision will 
reflect a comparison of two types of error cost.  If the law is kept stable, the error cost is 
that from failing to obtain risk reduction from those parties who ought to change their 
precautions, including from new entrants to the activity.  If the law is altered, the error 
cost is that from forcing those parties to bear the costs of change who ought not to have to 
adopt new precautions.  Whether it is best on net to keep the law stable or to alter it may 
be viewed as reflecting a comparison of these two types of error cost.  As a general 
matter, the greater the fraction of individuals who engaged in an activity in the past, the 
more durable and expensive their investments in precautions, the greater the transition 
costs associated with change, and the less the advantage in adopting new precautions, the 
more likely it will be that the law should remain stable. 
3.9 Participation in activities and grandfathering.  In the analysis so far, I have 
taken parties’ participation in activities as given – I have presumed that some parties 
participate in the potentially harmful activity both periods and that others enter the 
activity in period 2.  How would the analysis of grandfathering be altered if I were to 
allow parties to decide whether and when to enter into the activity?   
  14In this expanded model, grandfathering would increase participation in activities 
because it would reduce the costs of participation.  For example, a firm that I had 
supposed would only have entered the harmful activity in period 2 might now choose to 
enter in period 1 in order to be able to obtain grandfathered status and operate later in 
period 2 at lower cost.   
The increased participation in activities due to grandfathering would generally be 
socially undesirable.  As is well known, under a regime of legal standards, parties engage 
in potentially harmful activities to a socially excessive extent – because they do not have 
to pay for any harm that they cause provided that they comply with the standards.
21  A 
firm that installs smoke scrubbers as mandated by pollution regulations does not have to 
pay for the pollution it still generates and thus might be led to operate even though it 
should not.  This problem of socially excessive participation in activities under legal 
standards would seem to be exacerbated by grandfathering.  Similarly, under strict 
liability, participation in activities would be optimal in the absence of grandfathering, 
whereas grandfathering would lead to a problem of socially excessive participation. 
The conclusion from the above is that the optimal amount of grandfathering 
would probably be lower on account of consideration of participation in potentially 
harmful activities.  That is, because grandfathering would increase participation in 
harmful activities, and because such enhanced participation would tend to be socially 
undesirable, grandfathering would be socially desirable less often than I found it to be.  
  
4. Formal Analysis 
I here present a formal analysis of most of the content of sections 2 and 3 of the 
text.  Because the interpretation of the model has been addressed there, I will aim for 
brevity below.  
  4.1 Basic model.  Risk-neutral parties engage in a potentially harmful activity. 
The probability of harm each period depends on the level of precautions in that period. 
The magnitude of the possible harm is not known in the first period, but it is learned 
before the second period decision about precautions is made.
22  Let 
  xi   =  level of precautions in period i, i = 1, 2; xi $0; 
         p(xi)  =  probability of an accident in period i; pN(xi) < 0; pN(xi) → !4 as xi → 0; 
pO(xi) > 0; 
  h    =  harm if an accident occurs; 
         f(h)   =  probability density of h in the first period; h is known in the second period;   
h $ 0.
23  
                                                 
21 On the basic problem that the negligence rule (and regulatory standards) fail to moderate 
adequately parties’ participation in potentially harmful activities, see originally Shavell (1980).  As 
emphasized there, the problem does not exist under strict liability, for parties must pay for harm due to their 
activity under that rule regardless of their degree of precaution. 
  
22 That harm is uncertain rather than that the cost of precautions or their productivity is uncertain 
is inessential to the main qualitative conclusions.  See section 4.5 infra.  
  
23 It could be assumed that uncertainty about the level of harm is not completely resolved after 
period 1, but this would not alter the nature of the conclusions. 
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only in period 2. 
One assumption that will be considered is that precautions are nondurable 
(naturally interpreted as modifiable effort to prevent an accident).  Under this assumption, 
the cost of precautions in each period is xi, so that the total cost of precautions for a party 
who engages in the activity both periods is x1  + x2; costs of precautions each period are 
independent.  If a party engages in the activity only in the second period, its cost is x2. 
The alternative assumption is that precautions are durable (naturally interpreted as 
acquisition of a device to reduce accident risk).  In this case, it is assumed that if x1 is the 
level of precautions that a party takes in period 1 and this is not changed in period 2 (that 
is, x1  = x2), then there is no additional cost incurred by the party in period 2, so that the 
cost of precautions over the two periods is just x1; but if precautions are altered in period 
2, the cost of precautions over the two periods is x1  + x2.  (The interpretation of this 
assumption is that a different level of precautions corresponds to purchase of a device in 
period 2 that replaces the period 1 device.
24)  If a party engages in the activity only in the 
second period, its cost is x2.
25  
4.2 Socially optimal precautions in the basic model.  The social goal is to 
minimize expected social costs, where social costs are the costs associated with the 
precautions xi and of harm caused.  For convenience, denote the x that minimizes x + 
p(x)h by x*(h); that is, x*(h) is the optimal level of precautions if h is the harm resulting 
from an accident in a single-period model where the cost of precautions x is x.  Note that 
x*(h) is uniquely defined and positive for all positive h and that x*(h) is increasing in h.
26 
We will call x*(h) the conventionally optimal level of precautions for harm h.
In the case of nondurable precautions, social costs for a party engaging in the 
activity both periods are x1 + p(x1)h + x2 + p(x2)h.  In period 2, when x2 is chosen, h is 
known, so that it will be optimal for x2 to minimize x2 + p(x2)h.  Hence, the optimal x2 is 
x*(h).  In period 1, when x1 is chosen, h is not known, so the optimal x1 minimizes x1 + 
p(x1)E(h), where E(h) is the expectation of h.  Thus, the optimal x1, is x*(E(h)).  For a 
party engaging in the activity only in period 2, social costs are x2 + p(x2)h, so optimal 
                                                 
24 A different formulation would correspond to an interpretation of a change in durable precautions 
in which the period 1 device is not replaced but enhanced or supplemented in period 2.  As discussed in 
section 4.5(a), the main conclusions about grandfathering would not be different under this assumption.  
 
25 The model of durable precautions and of uncertain harm bears some similarity to models of 
irreversible investments (because a change in a durable precaution results in its loss) and uncertainty, 
notably with regard to resource and environmental economics; see, e.g., Arrow and Fisher (1974), Dixit 
and Pindyck (1994) at 412-418, and Weitzman (2003) at 60-65 and 139-145.  But the emphasis in the latter 
literature is different: it is on the point that irreversible steps are better not to take until uncertainty is 
resolved (it is better to refrain from cutting down a forest until it is known how much value it will have to 
the environment).  Here, the emphasis is on what should be done after uncertainty is resolved (whether 
durable precautions should be changed after the magnitude of harm becomes known).   
 
26 The first-order condition for minimization of x + p(x)h is 1 + pN(x)h = 0.  Because pO(x) > 0, the 
first-order condition determines a minimum and this must be unique.  Implicit differentiation of the first-
order condition shows that x*(h) is increasing in h.  For any positive h, the first-order condition must hold 
for some x, given the assumption that pN(x) → !4 as x → 0.  
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activity both periods.  To summarize, we have 
Proposition 1.  In the case of nondurable precautions, if a party engages in the 
activity both periods,  
(a) optimal precaution in period 1 is x*(E(h)), that is, the conventionally optimal 
precaution when expected harm given the occurrence of an accident is E(h);  
  (b) optimal precaution in period 2 is x*(h), the conventionally optimal precaution 
when harm is h. 
(c) It follows that optimal precaution in period 2 is different from that in period 1 
with probability one. 
If a party engages in the activity only in period 2, 
(d) optimal precaution in period 2 is x*(h), the same as optimal precaution in 
period 2 for a party who had engaged in the activity in period 1. 
Part (c) is true because h will be different from E(h) with probability 1 (only by 
coincidence would the continuously distributed h turn out to equal E(h)). 
In the case of durable precautions, consider the optimal x2 conditional on x1.  If x2 
= x1, expected social cost in period 2 is p(x1)h.  If x2 is different from x1, expected social 
cost in period 2 is x2 + p(x2)h, so that it will be best that x2 = x*(h).  It follows that if h is 
such that 
(1)   p(x1)h # x*(h) + p(x*(h))h, 
then it is optimal for x2 to remain at x1; otherwise, x2 should be changed to x*(h).
27 
Condition (1) holds for h in an interval I(x1) = [0, b(x1)], where 0 < h*(x1) < b(x1), and 
where h*(x) is defined as the h satisfying x*(h) = x.
28  The explanation is as follows: if h 
< h*(x1), so that x*(h) < x1, it would make no sense to change and lower precaution, since 
x1 can be maintained as the level of precaution at no additional cost; and as long as h is 
not too much higher than h*(x1), it is not desirable to raise precaution to x*(h) for that 
would entail bearing the entire cost of x*(h) whereas x1 can be maintained for free. 
  We next describe the optimal choice of x1, denoted by x1*.  Social costs as a 
function of x1  are   
(2)   S(x1) =  [x1  + p(x1)E(h)]  +   
                    4 
                    + [Pr(I(x1)][p(x1)E(h|I(x1))]  +  I[x*(h) + p(x*(h))h]f(h)dh,              
                                                           b(x1)  
where Pr means probability.  The first term on the right is expected social costs in period 
1, the second term is expected social costs if h is in the interval I(x1), when it is optimal to 
leave precaution unchanged at x1, and the third term is expected social costs if h is above 
the interval I(x1), when it is optimal to change precaution to x*(h).  Differentiating (2) 
yields the first-order condition determining the optimal x1, 
(3)    [1 + pN(x1)E(h)] + [Pr(I(x1)][pN(x1)E(h|I(x1))] =  0. 
                                                 
27 For simplicity, I assume that where (1) holds with equality, x2 remains at x1, and I adopt similar 
conventions below without comment.  
 
28 For h # h*(x1), we know that x*(h) # x1.  Hence, p(x1) # p(x*(h)), implying that (1) holds.  For 
h > h*(x1) the left side of (1) grows faster with h than the right, since the derivative of the left with respect 
to h is p(x1) and the derivative of the right is p(x*(h)), and the latter is smaller since x*(h) > x1.  Hence (1) 
does not hold for h sufficiently large, and b(x1) is as claimed and is unique.   
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and the indirect influence in the second period, that because it will be optimal to maintain 
x1 for h in I(x1), there will be a second period effect as well, which is to lower the 
expected costs of harm then.  (Changing x1 also alters the endpoint b(x1) of I(x1), but this 
has no first-order influence on social welfare.
29)  It follows from (3) that 1 + pN(x1)E(h) > 
0, implying that x1*  >  x*(E(h)).  In other words, the optimal first period level of 
precaution x1* is higher than it would be were the first period the only concern, for there 
is a second-period expected payoff as well.  
If a party engages in the activity only in period 2, since social costs are x2 + 
p(x2)h, it will be best that x2 = x*(h).  Thus, his precaution may be different from that of a 
party who engages in the activity both periods. 
We therefore have established the next result.  
Proposition 2.  In the case of durable precautions, if a party engages in the 
activity both periods,  
(a) optimal precaution in period 1 is determined by condition (3) and exceeds 
x*(E(h)), the conventionally optimal precaution for expected harm of E(h); 
  (b) optimal precaution in period 2 remains equal to period 1 precaution x1* if 
harm h is in I(x1*) = [0, b(x1*)] (that is, if h satisfies p(x1*)h # x*(h) + p(x*(h))h ), but 
optimal precaution is the conventionally optimal level x*(h) if h is higher.  
(c) It follows that optimal precaution in period 2 is different from precaution in 
period 1 with a probability less than one (equal to that of h exceeding b(x1*)). 
If a party engages in the activity only in period 2, 
(d) optimal precaution in period 2 is the conventionally optimal level x*(h). 
Hence, optimal precaution for a new entrant is less than for a prior participant if h  < 
h(x1*), exceeds that for a prior participant if h is in [h(x1*), b(x1*)], and is equal to that 
for a prior participant if h > b(x1*). 
4.3 Optimal legal rules in the basic model.  Having determined optimal 
behavior, let us discuss how it can be achieved under legal rules.  We consider two types 
of legal rule.  Under the first, strict liability for harm, parties are assumed to pay for any 
harm h that they cause.
30  Under the second, parties’ precautions are regulated; we 
assume that they are required to obey a standard of precaution (and that this is effectively 
enforced).  When a legal rule in period 2 depends on a party’s precaution in period 1, we 
will say that grandfathering applies. 
Under strict liability, since a party pays for all harm, a party’s private problem is 
the same as the social problem, so that it is clear that a party will choose precautions in a 
socially optimal manner.  
Remark 1.  Under strict liability, parties will choose socially optimal precautions. 
In particular, they will do so in both periods, regardless of whether precautions are 
durable or nondurable, and grandfathering will not be desirable. 
                                                 
29 That is, the terms obtained by differentiation of (2) due to changes b(x1) reduce to zero, since (1) 
holds with equality at this point. 
 
30  A fine paid to the state equal to harm, or a corrective tax equal to expected harm, is equivalent 
to strict liability.  
  
  18   Under regulation, presuming that the state has sufficient information to calculate 
optimal precautions, it can achieve them, so, in view of Propositions 1 and 2, we can state  
Remark 2.  Under optimal regulation of precautions, parties are required to choose 
optimal levels of precaution.  In the case of nondurable precautions, grandfathering is not 
optimal; precaution in period 2 is x*(h) whether or not parties engaged in the activity in 
period 1.  In the case of durable precautions, grandfathering may be optimal; parties who 
engaged in the activity in period 1 are permitted to maintain their precautions at x1* 
unless h turns out to exceed b(x1*), whereas parties who enter the activity in period 2 
must set precautions equal to x*(h).   
4.4  Extensions.  I here sketch several extensions of the model of durable 
precautions (interpreted as devices). 
(a)  Maintenance cost, scrap value, and transition cost.  Suppose that if the 
precaution x1 is kept in period 2, a maintenance cost m will be incurred; that if precaution 
changes in period 2, the period 1 precaution can be sold for scrap value s(x1); and that if 
the precaution changes in period 2, a transition cost t will be incurred (associated, say, 
with the removal of the period 1 device).     
Now reconsider the optimal x2 conditional on x1.  If x2 is different from x1, 
expected social cost in period 2 will be x2 + p(x2)h – s(x1) + t, so that it will again be 
optimal that x2 = x*(h).  Hence, if h is such that  
(4)   p(x1)h + m # x*(h) + p(x*(h))h  – s(x1) + t 
it will be optimal for x2 to remain at x1; otherwise, x2 should change to x*(h).  Note that if 
s(x1) + m > t, condition (4) holds less often than (1).  This makes sense, since scrap value 
and maintenance costs are factors that make keeping x1 less attractive, whereas transition 
cost makes keeping x1 more attractive.  With condition (4) replacing (1), one can 
determine a revised condition for x1* analogous to (3), but I will omit the details here 
(and likewise I will omit discussion of x1* below with regard to modifications).    
Under strict liability, behavior will be optimal, appropriately reflecting scrap 
value, maintenance cost, and transition cost, but under regulation the regulator must take 
them explicitly into account.  
(b) Modification of property.  Suppose that modification of property may be 
undertaken in period 2 and will yield a private gain for parties (such as a renovation 
allowing a factory to produce goods at lower cost), where the gain depends on the 
magnitude of the modification investment.  Let g(k) be the gain from modification given 
the investment k, where g is increasing and concave in k.  Modification is assumed also to 
result in the lowering of the transition cost of a change in precaution (such as when a 
renovation at a factory would allow an opportunity for easier replacement of pollution 
control equipment).  Thus, let transition cost t  =  t(k), where t is decreasing and convex 
in k.   
Accordingly, social welfare in period 2 is g(k) – k – p(x1)h if there is 
grandfathering and g(k) – k – [x*(h) + p(x*(h))h + t(k)] = g(k) – k – t(k) – [x*(h) + 
p(x*(h))h] if there is not grandfathering. 
Given k and thus t(k), grandfathering is socially desirable when  
(5)   p(x1)h  # x*(h) + p(x*(h))h + t(k) 
(abstracting for simplicity from maintenance cost and scrap value).   
Consider the optimal k and the optimal choice about grandfathering in period 2.  
Let k* maximize the net return from investment g(k) – k, so that k* is determined by gN(k) 
  19= 1.  Also, let k** maximize g(k) – k – t(k), the net return from investment minus 
transition cost; thus k** is determined by gN(k) – tN(k)  = 1.  It is clear that k** > k*;
31 the 
reason is that there is a payoff from k in addition to increasing g, which is decreasing t.  
If there is grandfathering, the optimal k is k*, for social welfare given 
grandfathering is g(k) – k – p(x1)h and k* maximizes the first two terms.  Likewise, if 
there is no grandfathering, the optimal k is k**, for social welfare when there is no 
grandfathering is g(k) – k – t(k) – [x*(h) + p(x*(h))h].   
Hence, to determine whether grandfathering is optimal, we can compare social 
welfare under grandfathering and k* to that without grandfathering under k**.  If 
(6)   g(k*) – k* – p(x1)h > g(k**) – k** – t(k**) – [x*(h) + p(x*(h))h], 
then grandfathering is optimal, whereas if (6) does not hold, then grandfathering is not 
optimal and optimal precaution is x*(h). 
  Note that the optimal solution as just described reflects the following factors.  
First, the value of modification, due to the gains it yields, may, as a byproduct, lower 
transition cost enough to make a change in precaution optimal, when otherwise 
grandfathering would be optimal.  If a change in precaution is optimal, then modification 
investment should be higher than were its direct gains the only benefit from it, because it 
also results in reduced transition cost.  
Again, under strict liability, behavior, and thus modifications as well as 
precautions, will automatically be optimal.  Under regulation, the regulator must 
determine the optimal solution, but note that as long as the regulator determines whether 
or not grandfathering is permitted, the parties will be induced to choose the right 
modification investment:  If grandfathering is permitted, parties will of course not spend 
on a new precaution, and thus will choose k to maximize g(k) – k, so will choose k*; if 
grandfathering is not permitted, parties will bear t(k), will choose k to maximize g(k) – k 
– t(k), so will choose k**.  
(c) Imperfect information of the state.  For the state to achieve optimal behavior, it 
must have certain information.  Under strict liability, all it need do is observe harm h. 
Under regulation, however, it must be able to observe precaution and to calculate optimal 
precaution, implying that it must know all functional relationships.  This gives rise to a 
host of problems that were described in section 3.5.  Hence, for example, suppose that the 
state cannot observe maintenance cost m, and knows only its distribution.  Then the state 
must make a decision about grandfathering on the basis of its knowledge of the 
distribution of m.  If the state disallows grandfathering, because m is on average large, it 
will sometimes make errors, since parties for whom m is small, who should be 
grandfathered, will have to change precaution, and so forth.   
(d) Imperfect information of the state and modification.  It is worth taking 
particular note of the implication of imperfect information with regard to modification of 
property because of the policy importance of modification and grandfathering.  As will be 
discussed in section 5, grandfathered status is often removed if the degree of modification 
is sufficiently large.  A rationale for this type of rule is that the magnitude of modification 
k may serve as an implicit indicator of unobservable transition cost – with a major 
modification signaling a low transition cost t and thus a lesser need for grandfathering.  
                                                 
31  We know that gN(k*) – tN(k*)  = 1 – tN(k*) > 1.  Thus, to satisfy gN(k) + tN(k)  = 1, k must be 
raised from k* (since gO(k) – tO(k) < 0).     .   
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investment may be inefficiently discouraged under the rule. 
To demonstrate these points we must modify the model so that there is variation 
in the levels of modification investment k that parties wish to choose.
32  A natural way to 
do this is to assume that the productivity of modification investment varies across the 
population of parties: let the gain from modification investment k be 2g(k), where 2 is a 
productivity parameter (a party’s type), drawn according to some probability distribution 
over the positive numbers.  Let k*(2) maximize 2g(k) – k  and k**(2) maximize 2g(k) – k 
– t(k), and note that k*(2)  <  k**(2) and that both are increasing in 2.
33   
The determination of the socially optimal outcome in period 2 is essentially as 
described in (b).  It can be verified that if grandfathering is optimal for parties of type 2N, 
then grandfathering must be optimal for parties with 2 < 2N.
34  Hence, unless 
grandfathering is optimal for all 2 or for no 2, there must exist a critical value, say 2c, 
such that for 2 # 2c, grandfathering is optimal, and for higher 2  it is not.  This is the 
interesting case
35 and is what we will consider.  Accordingly, at the optimum parties with 
2 # 2c choose k*(2) and parties with higher 2  choose k**(2), so that the graph of 
investment k is increasing in 2, with a discontinuity at2c, where it rises from k*(2c) to 
k**(2c).  
Now assume that the state cannot observe transition cost t so cannot base 
grandfathering on t (or on 2, which is unobservable) but can observe modification 
investment k and base grandfathering on it.  The state can select a critical value kc and 
allow grandfathering only if k # kc and in this way implicitly attempt to mimic the 
optimum.  Given kc, it is clear that parties for whom k*(2) < kc will choose k*(2) and thus 
will be grandfathered.
36  Also parties for whom k*(2) exceeds but is sufficiently close to 
kc will choose kc in order to be grandfathered – in other words, there will be a mass point 
of parties at kc.
37  Parties with larger 2 will not find it worthwhile to choose kc in order to 
                                                 
32  Otherwise the state can, as I noted above in (b), calculate what is optimal for the (identical) 
individuals and just allow or disallow grandfathering, whichever is optimal. 
 
33 Optimal modification investment k*(2) is determined by 2gN(k) = 1.  Implicitly differentiating 
with respect to 2 gives gN(k) + 2gO(k)k*N(2) = 0, so that k*N(2) = – gN(k)/2gO(k) > 0.  That k**N(2) > 0 is 
shown similarly. 
 
34 Grandfathering is optimal at a 2 when the analogue to (6) holds, namely, when 2g(k*(2) – k*(2) 
– p(x1)h > 2g(k**(2)) – k**(2) – t(k**(2)) – [x*(h) + p(x*(h))h].  We want to show that if this inequality 
holds at 2N, it must hold for lower 2.  To establish that, it is clearly sufficient to demonstrate that 2g(k*(2) – 
k*(2) – [2g(k**(2)) – k**(2) – t(k**(2))] is decreasing in 2.  But the derivative of this expression with 
respect to 2 is (by the envelope theorem) just g(k*(2)) – g(k**(2)), which is negative since k*(2) < k**(2). 
  
35 Otherwise the state can achieve optimality simply by allowing grandfathering or disallowing it 
for all parties. 
 
36 They are clearly better off at any k grandfathered than not, and because they can choose the 
optimal k and be grandfathered they must prefer this. 
  
37 If a party for whom k*(2) > kc chooses k # kc, he will be best off at kc, given concavity of the 
objective function and that k*(2) > kc, and his utility will be 2g(kc) – kc.  If he chooses k > kc, since he will 
not be grandfathered, his best choice of k will be k**(2), and his utility will be 2g(k**(2)) – k**(2) – 
  21be grandfathered and will thus choose k**(2) > kc.  By choosing kc in a second-best 
optimal way (close to k*(2c)), the state can approximate optimal behavior, but optimal 
behavior cannot be achieved, at least because of the massing of parties at kc who do not 
invest more (not k*(2)) in modification in order to preserve their grandfathered status.   
(e) Second-best legal change in the absence of grandfathering; incentives to 
participate in activities. What was said in sections 3.8 and 3.9 is clear and nothing need 
be added here.  
  4.5  Robustness of the model.  I here discuss why relaxing either of two 
assumptions that were made in the model would not change the qualitative nature of the 
conclusions. 
(a) The assumption that a durable device must be replaced rather than 
supplemented:  I assumed for simplicity that a durable precaution was a device, such as a 
smoke arrestor, and that if the precaution were to change in period 2, a new device would 
be needed and would replace the old device.  Thus, I assumed that if the period 2 
precaution x2 is different from x1, then x2 needs to be spent in period 2 and the probability 
of harm is p(x2).  However, another assumption that fits certain situations is that the 
period 1 device would not be replaced but instead would be enhanced or supplemented 
with another device.  For instance, perhaps a new component can be installed in the 
period 1 smoke arrestor or perhaps another smoke arrestor can be added so that two 
smoke arrestors function to control pollution instead of one.  In such situations it is 
natural to assume, though, that it is less efficient to spend x1 on a period 1 device and then 
an additional amount x2 to supplement it than to spend the same amount x1 + x2 at once on 
a different device.  Under this assumption, grandfathering may well be desirable, since 
the relative lack of efficacy of spending to supplement x1 may make staying put best, 
even though new entrants spend x*(h) > x1.
38  
(b) The assumption that uncertainty in the second period concerns the magnitude 
of harm rather than the technology or cost of risk reduction:  If the uncertainty in period 2 
concerns the risk reduction function instead of the harm, it is evident that the main 
qualitative conclusions reached would not be altered.  For example, suppose that in 
period 2, the probability of harm is given by p(tx), where x is expenditure in that period 
and t is an uncertain technological or cost parameter.  If t > 1, then by spending x, the 
effective expenditure would be greater than x, so such t correspond to technological 
advances or reductions in cost.  The choice facing a party in the second period is between 
not changing precaution, in which case the risk of harm would be p(x), and changing 
precaution and spending x*(t), the x that minimizes x + p(tx)h.  Grandfathering is best if 
p(x)h < x*(t) + p(tx*(t))h, and the analysis would proceed along the lines that were 
developed above.  
                                                                                                                                                 
t(k**(2)) – x*(h).   He will do whichever is better.  Now at the 2 such that k*(2) = kc, we have 2g(kc) – kc = 
2g(k*(2)) – k*(2) > 2g(k**(2)) – k**(2) – t(k**(2)) – x*(h).  Hence, it must be true in a positive 
neighborhood above this 2  that 2g(kc) – kc > 2g(k**(2)) – k**(2) – t(k**(2)) – x*(h), in other words, that 
choosing kc is better than not being grandfathered and choosing k**(2) in this neighborhood.   
 
38 To amplify, the second period probability of harm might be written as p(x1, x2), where p2(x1, x2) 
< 0.  In such situations, suppose that p2(x1, x2) > pN(x1 + x2), that is, spending an additional dollar in period 2 
after the period 1 device is installed reduces risk less than spending that dollar on a better period 1 device.  
Then it is possible that –p2(x1, 0)h < 1, so that it is not worth supplementing the period 1 device even 
though x*(h) > x1.  
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5. The Law in the Light of the Theory  
  I now discuss briefly certain aspects of the law against the background of the 
analysis of legal change and past behavior in the preceding sections.  I first observe that 
the law seems to exhibit a general constancy that I see in part as a reflection of the 
importance of past behavior.  I then examine when and how the law employs 
grandfathering.  
  General stability of the law.  Legal rules appear to me to display a significantly 
greater degree of stability than would be expected were the only argument against change 
in law the avoidance of additional administrative costs (that is, the burden on legislators 
and on courts of considering and of promulgating new rules).  If the avoidance of 
administrative costs were the sole factor favoring legal stability, then legal rules would 
probably be modified much more often than they are in reality, because added 
administrative costs are likely to be small in relation to the benefits that even quite 
modestly altered behavior would bring about for large populations of actors.  Were 
administrative costs the only consideration disfavoring legal change, I believe that all 
manner of our regulations and legal duties would be amended in a more or less 
continuous fashion, as advances occur in the technology of risk reduction and as new 
information about hazards develops.  
That legal rules do not change with this frequency I suggest is explained 
importantly by the fact that individuals and firms make many decisions to take what I 
have described as durable precautions.  In particular, many of their decisions have lasting 
aspects, such that real risk reduction continues without any, or with only modest, added 
cost, whereas compliance with new rules would be expensive and effectively squander 
their prior investments in risk reduction.  The reason that parties’ decisions tend to have 
lasting aspects is that the decisions often involve investment in physical capital that is 
directly or implicitly required by legal rules, or investment in training and intellectual 
capital, or investment in financial, contractual, or reporting practices (recall section 2.2).  
Further, in many contexts, it would be costly or impractical for the legal system to 
take parties’ earlier investments in compliance into direct account, determining who 
made what investments in the past and their present effectiveness, in order to grandfather 
some of them.  Hence, in reality the law must often apply to all parties uniformly, and 
thus either remain the same for the entire population engaged in an activity or change for 
the whole population (see section 3.8).  For this reason, and in recognition of the parties 
who have made durable investments in past compliance, it is frequently best for the law 
to remain fixed even though improvements in technology or new information may seem 
to call for its modification.  Only when a sufficient fraction of the parties who complied 
in the past ought to change their behavior and satisfy new duties – only when the 
pressures for change have built to a certain point – will it be socially advantageous for the 
law to be modified.   
Grandfathering as a feature of the law.  Although as just stated the law tends to  
exhibit stability, and practical difficulties may prevent the legal system from taking past 
behavior into explicit account, grandfathering is still a widely-encountered aspect of our 
legal system.
39  Areas in which grandfathering is observed include pollution regulation;
40 
                                                 
39  I am informed by individuals familiar with Continental legal systems that they also employ 
grandfathering, although they do not use that descriptive term.  
  23land use and real estate zoning ordinances;
41 building and safety codes;
42 licensing of 
professionals;
43 the enforcement of wills and trusts;
44 ownership of firearms;
45 and 
immigration status.
46  Also, as I will suggest below, grandfathering is an implicit feature 
of the negligence determination under standard tort principles.  That grandfathering 
should be a common feature of the law is, of course, what one would expect in the light 
of the theoretical analysis presented here and, as has been emphasized, the view that 
compliance with legal rules involves many decisions with durable aspects.  Additionally, 
it is worth noting that the type of grandfathering that we see is what one would predict, in 
the sense that it focuses on durable forms of compliance, as will be evident, for example, 
when I discuss some of the specifics of grandfathering in regard to electric utility plants 
and zoning.  To my knowledge, grandfathering is not applied to readily modifiable 
behavior of parties, such as their driving speed.  In other words, at least the gross 
characteristics of grandfathering are what one would expect in principle.     
Tort law and implicit grandfathering.  Grandfathering seems to be a latent feature 
of tort law, due to the manner in which the negligence rule is likely to be applied.  As a 
general matter, a party will be found negligent for failing to take a precaution that 
resulted in harm if the cost of the precaution was less than the risk-reduction benefit that 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
40  For a general description and survey of grandfathering and its effects in regard to pollution 
regulation, see Stavins (2006).  He relates grandfathering to, among other legislation, the Clean Air Act 
(CAA) 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401 et seq. (2000); the Clean Water Act (CWA) 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 et seq. (2000); 
the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f et seq.; the Resource Conservation and Recovery 
Act (RCRA) 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901 et seq. (2000); and various state and local mandates.  On the effects of 
grandfathering, see, e.g., Becker and Henderson (2000), Bushnell and Wolfram (2006), Crandall (1983), 
Gollop and Roberts (1983), Gruenspecht (1982), and Nelson, Tietenberg, and Donihue (1993). 
    
41 See, e.g., 1 ROBERT M. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING ch. 6 (3d ed. 1986); 3 ROBERT 
M. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING ch. 20 (3d ed. 1986); 101A C.J.S. Zoning and Land Planning § 
101 (2005); 2 JAMES METZENBAUM, LAW OF ZONING ch. X-g (2d ed. 1955).  
  
42 See, e.g., 13 AM. JUR. 2D Buildings § 5 (2000); 7A EUGENE MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF 
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 24.512 (3d ed. 2005); 39A C.J.S. Health & Environment § 52 (2003). 
  
43 Many statutes allow grandfathering of old licensees when new requirements are established.  
See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 54-213 (2006) (concerning accountants); ARK. CODE ANN. § 17-28-310 (2006) 
(concerning electricians); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 487.08 (2005) (concerning judicial officers); MISS. CODE 
ANN. § 73-53-7 (2005) (concerning veterinarians). 
   
44  See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 8-101 (2001) (concerning provisions for transition); UNIF. 
PROBATE CODE § 2-506 (2001) (concerning execution of wills); UNIF. TRUST CODE § 1106 (2001) 
(concerning trust relationships).  
 
45 See, e.g., D.C. CT. R. ANN. § 7-2501.01 (concerning possession of unregistered handguns); Fox 
Butterfield, As Expiration Looms, Gun Ban’s Effect is Debated, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2004, at A14. 
 
46 See, e.g., Adjustment of Status To That Person Admitted for Permanent Residence; Temporary 
Removal of Certain Restrictions of Eligibility, 66 Fed. Reg. 16,383 (March 26, 2001) (to be codified at 8 
C.F.R. pt. 245). 
 
  24it would have generated.
47  In a negligence determination, the risk-reduction that the 
courts would naturally consider I believe to be the reduction from the level of risk that the 
actor already was accomplishing, and for this basic reason the negligence determination 
should result in desirable grandfathering.  Consider an example similar to that in the 
Introduction:  A refinery had installed device A to reduce the risk of an explosion.  This 
device was state-of-the-art five years ago, when the refinery was built, but a new, cheaper 
device B that is slightly more effective in risk-reduction became available last year.  If 
the refinery did not install B last year and as a result an explosion occurred, would a court 
hold the refinery negligent?  It is unlikely, since the court would presumably reason that 
the additional risk-reduction that device B would have accomplished would be minor, 
given the risk-reduction already generated by device A.  Yet if the refinery had just been 
built last year and had installed device A even though B was available at the time, the 
refinery would be found negligent for not having chosen the safety device that was more 
effective and cheaper.  In other words, the duty of care for a new facility is different from 
that for an old facility.  This illustration shows why conventional application of the 
negligence rule should tend to lead to grandfathering, even though it would not be 
described as such.  
  Regulation of power plant air pollution and grandfathering.  Electric power 
generating plants are an important source of air pollution, responsible for approximately 
two-thirds of the country’s SO2 emissions, a quarter of its NOx emissions, and two fifths 
of its CO2 emissions.
48  These plants are regulated in significant ways under the Clean 
Air Act of 1970 and amendments to it.
49  
A salient feature of the Clean Air Act is grandfathering: power plants built before 
1970 do not face the standards applying to plants built afterward, which are obligated to 
meet more rigorous, contemporaneous pollution control requirements.  Many of these 
pre-1970 plants, mostly coal-fired, still operate today and are responsible for most of the 
air pollution generated by power plants.
50   
                                                 
47 See, e.g., the description of the negligence determination in Dobbs (2000) at ch. 7, and the 
discussion in Landes and Posner (1987) at 85–88, 102, and in Shavell (1987) at 19–20.  
 
48 See, e.g., Reitze (2002) at 371–72. 
  
49 The original Clean Air Act, passed in 1963, provided grants to state governments for research 
and air pollution control programs, acknowledged the danger of motor vehicle exhaust, and promoted 
emissions standard development for motor vehicles and stationary sources.  See Am. Meteorological Soc’y, 
Legislation: A Look at U.S. Air Pollution Laws and their Amendments, at 
http://www.ametsoc.org/sloan/cleanair/index.html (last visited August 28, 2007).  The current national air 
pollution program is based on the 1970 Clean Air Act amendments, enacted the same year that the EPA 
was established.  Further significant amendments were made in 1977 and 1990.  Pub. L. No. 95-95; 91 Stat. 
685; Pub .L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399.  For useful accessible internet sources on the Clean Air Act, see 
Envtl. Literacy Council, Clean Air Act, at www.enviroliteracy.org/article.php/6.html (last visted August 
28, 2007); Environmental Protection Agency, Clean Air Act, at www.epa.gov/air/oaq_caa.html (last visited 
August 28, 2007).  See also Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Clean Air & Energy, at www.nrdc.org/air/default.asp 
(last visited August 28, 2007).  Other general sources on the Clean Air Act include Squillace and Wooley 
(1999), Belden (2001), and Reitze (2001).  
 
50 See, e.g,  Reitze (2002) at  384–85 and Varadarajan (2003) at 2553–54. 
  
  25Although plants built before 1970 are grandfathered, these plants may have to 
forfeit their grandfathered status if they are modified.  That happens under certain rules 
promulgated by the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”), but only if a plant carries 
out a major modification resulting in a significant increase in regulated pollutant 
emissions.
51  If a change in a plant does not significantly increase regulated emissions or 
if the change is limited to routine maintenance, grandfathering status is ordinarily 
preserved.
52  The definitions and interpretations of a “significant” increase in regulated 
pollutants and of  “major modifications” versus “routine maintenance” are complex and 
have been the subject of continuing debate and litigation, given their importance to firms 
because of the financial advantage of sustained grandfathering.
53  Whether a modification 
results in a significant emissions increase varies from pollutant to pollutant,
54 and 
complicated subrules govern the calculation of increases.
55  Whether a change is major or 
constitutes routine maintenance depends on whether the change is routine in the 
industry.
56  Also, under a proposed rule, recently vacated by the courts, whether a change 
would be considered a modification would depend on whether its cost exceeded 20% of 
the capital costs of replacement components.
57   
What can be said about the grandfathering of power plants under the Clean Air 
Act in the light of the analysis of this article?  That there should be some grandfathering 
of power plants is obviously consistent with the analysis.  On one hand, the costs of 
changing pollution control methods are often large, involving significant expenditures on 
                                                 
51 For useful overviews of the rules regarding modifications, see Nash and Revesz (2007) and 
Varadarajan (2003).  
52 See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. §§ 51.166(a)(7), 51.166(b)(2).  These features of the regulation of 
modifications are applicable under the rules of New Source Review in “attainment” areas (where goals 
under the National Ambient Air Quality Standards have been met), to which I will largely refer in the text.  
The regulation of modifications is different in non-attainment areas.  See Environmental Protection 
Agency, New Source Review: Basic Information, at http://www.epa.gov/nsr/info.html (last visited August 
28, 2007).  Moreover, modifications are also governed by the New Source Performance Standards 
(“NSPS”), which state in part that an alteration amounting to a “reconstruction” could result in the loss of 
grandfathered status even if the amount of pollution does not increase.  To be a “reconstruction,” the cost of 
the alteration must exceed 50% of the cost of building a comparable new facility and meeting NSPS 
regulations must be technologically and economically feasible.  See 40 C.F.R. § 60.15(b). 
  
53 See, e.g., Wisconsin Elec. Power Co. v. Reilly, 893 F.2d 901 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. 
Duke Energy Corp., 278 F. Supp. 2d 619 (M.D.N.C. 2003); United States v. Alabama Power Co., 372 F. 
Supp. 2d 1283 (N.D. Ala. 2005); Notice of Final Action on Reconsideration, 70 Fed. Reg. 33838 (June 10, 
2005) (summarizing debate over rule governing equipment replacement as routine maintenance).  See also 
Decision Leaves High Court as EPA’s Last Option to Reverse NSR Ruling, CLEAN AIR REPORT, July 13, 
2006, at sec. 14 (summarizing recent court decisions concerning the same). 
 
54 See 40 C.F.R. §§ 51.166(b)(23), 51.166(b)(39). 
 
55 See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. §§ 51.166(a)(7)(iv)(b), 51.166(b)(3).   
  
56 See Duke Energy Corp. (holding that the New Source Review test for determining whether a 
modification constitutes routine maintenance is whether the modification is routine in the industry). 
  
57 See 40 C.F.R. § 51.166(y) (vacated by New York v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 443 F.3d 880 (D.C. Cir. 
2006)). 
 
  26durable capital and perhaps alterations of plant design, and on the other hand, the 
equipment in place already achieves a reduction in pollution, making the benefits of 
compliance with new control methods marginal rather than total in nature. 
Yet the potentially unlimited duration of grandfathering of plants raises 
questions.
58  With the passage of time, an initial social advantage of grandfathering of a 
plant may diminish and then disappear, for two basic reasons.  First, the expenses of 
maintaining and repairing old plants tend to increase over time, as equipment and 
buildings degrade.  This reduces the cost advantage of grandfathering (see section 3.2).  
Second, the pollution control benefits of changes in abatement methods tend to rise over 
time, as the technology of pollution reduction advances.  Moreover, it seems that, in fact, 
the expected harm due to pollution has increased (for example, the greenhouse effect is 
now widely believed to be serious
59).  These factors increase the marginal payoff from 
change, such as switching fuel from coal to natural gas.  It is of course possible that 
administrative cost savings could justify an unlimited-in-time grandfathering rule, but 
given the high social costs of pollution, that does not appear plausible.  Hence, it seems 
that a superior regime to that of the Clean Air Act would limit the duration of 
grandfathering of power plants or require a showing of evidence for its continuation. 
The conditions under which modifications result in loss of grandfathering also 
provoke some skepticism.  A significant reason is that in important contexts any 
modification that does not raise the level of pollution is permitted – only modifications 
that increase pollution may result in loss of grandfathering.  This approach seems 
mistaken.  It could well be that a modification does not increase pollution yet ought to 
result in the loss of grandfathering status (see section 3.5) because it results in an 
opportunity to relatively cheaply install up-to-date pollution control technology, or to 
change from coal to natural gas, and thereby substantially lower emissions.  
Other questions about modifications and grandfathering may also be raised.  As I 
stressed in section 3.7, modifications are relevant to the decision whether to continue 
grandfathering especially to the degree that they inform us about the costs of changing to 
new pollution control technology; the expenditure or extent of a modification is only a 
weak indicator of these costs.  However, the EPA criteria that determine whether a 
modification is classified as major do not seem to be closely tied to the costs of changing 
to new technology (certainly the proposed 20% rule mentioned above was not closely 
tied to these costs).  
Regulation of real estate by zoning and building codes, and grandfathering.  In 
most areas of the country, real estate is regulated by zoning ordinances, building codes, 
and related rules, with requirements covering, among many other factors, lot size, setback 
distances of structures from property lines, percentages of land area covered by 
structures, height of structures, the safety and adequacy of the design of structures, and 
the materials and methods of construction.
60   
                                                 
58 Many critics have made points along the lines of this paragraph.  See, for example, Nash and 
Revesz (2007) and Varadarajan (2003).  
59 See Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Global Warming, at 
http://www.nrdc.org/globalWarming/default.asp (last visited August 28, 2007); Union of Concerned 
Scientists, Global Warming, at http://www.ucsusa.org/global_warming (last visited August 28, 2007). 
 
60 See, e.g., ANDERSON, supra note 25;  METZENBAUM, supra note 25; MCQUILLIN, supra note 26; 
13 AM. JUR. 2D Buildings § 5 (2000); 101A C.J.S. Zoning and Land Planning § 101 (2005).  See also, e.g., 
  27These regulations often include grandfathering provisions.  The general nature of 
the grandfathering is that if a structure was built before the passage of the regulation, the 
structure is permitted to be noncompliant and without limit of time.
61  Thus, if a setback 
rule says that buildings must be at least 50 feet from roads, but a building that was 
constructed beforehand is only 30 feet from a road, the building will not ever have to be 
moved or demolished in order to comply.  Still, not all regulations include grandfathering 
provisions, and notably, rules bearing on safety and health often do not.
62  For instance, 
certain requirements regarding septic tank hook up to sewer systems, safety fencing, and 
signage must be adhered to by all parties.
63
A grandfathered structure may lose its grandfathered status if modified.  A typical 
rule would disallow continuation of grandfathering if the cost of the modification 
exceeded a percentage, such as 50%, of the value of the structure.
64  
                                                                                                                                                 
NEW YORK CITY, N.Y., ZONING RESOLUTION (2006); NEW YORK CITY, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE tits. 26–27 
(2006); MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 780. 
 
61 See, e.g., 101A C.J.S. Zoning and Land Planning § 101 (2005) (“Since users of land generally 
acquire rights which cannot be cut off, zoning regulations operate only prospectively, in the absence of 
special provision to the contrary.”); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 40A § 6 (2006) (“[A] zoning ordinance or 
by-law shall not apply to structures or uses lawfully in existence or lawfully begun, or to a building or 
special permit issued before the first publication of notice of the public hearing on such ordinance or by-
law.”); BLOOMINGTON, IND., MUNICIPAL CODE § 20.08.01.01 (“Any structure, or any use of land or 
structure, which does not conform with one or more provisions of this zoning ordinance, but which 
lawfully existed upon the effective date of the provisions of this zoning ordinance with which the structure 
or use does not conform, shall be a lawful nonconforming use or structure.”). 
 
62 See MCQUILLIN, supra note 26, at § 24.512 (“[A]ccording to considerable authority, building 
codes or ordinances, or certain of their provisions may be made applicable to existing buildings....The 
question in these cases is whether the public welfare demands retroactive application and whether the 
property owners affected suffer unreasonable exactions as compared with the resulting public benefits.  
Thus, provisions relating to repairs, reconstructions, and alterations thereafter to be made, or requirements 
for the protection of health and lives of persons occupying buildings may be made applicable to existing 
structures.”). 
 
63  See, e.g., Renne v. Township of Waterford, 252 N.W.2d 842 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977) (affirming 
judgment that septic tank users must forgo using their septic tanks and pay for connecting to a new sewer 
system); Town of Hempstead v. Goldblatt, 9 N.Y.2d 101, 172 N.E.2d 562 (1961) (requiring compliance 
with local ordinance providing for safety fencing, setbacks, degrees of slope, barricades, lights, retaining 
walls, and maximum groundwater level before continuing sand pit operation); Lyman G. Realty Corp. v. 
Gillroy, 172 N.Y.S.2d 907 (App. Div. 1958) (ruling that company must obtain a permit to maintain its roof 
sign, even though the sign was constructed before the sign-safety-promoting permit requirement was 
enacted). 
 
64 See 83 AM. JUR 2D Zoning and Planning § 605 (2003).  See also, e.g., Marris v. City of 
Cedarburg, 176 Wis.2d 14, 498 N.W.2d 842 (1993) (considering claim that property had lost its 
grandfathered nonconforming status because of alterations, as defined by city ordinance, that exceeded 
50% of the property’s assessed value); Marcus v. Village of Mamaroneck, 283 N.Y. 325, 328, 28 N.E.2d 
856, 858 (1940) (featuring local ordinance according to which “no existing building devoted to a non-
conforming use may be altered at a cost for the alteration of a sum exceeding fifty percent of the assessed 
value of the lot and building.”). 
 
 
  28  The grandfathering of real estate as just summarized seems broadly consistent 
with the analysis of this article, as is illustrated by setback regulation.  A home that is 
only 30 feet from a road, instead of 50 feet as required by a zoning rule, presumably 
would be very expensive to move; the cost would be at least in the tens of thousands of 
dollars.  The social benefit of having a greater setback is probably largely aesthetic and 
much lower than the cost of moving the home.  If so, the grandfathering of a 
noncomplying setback would be socially sensible, and similar observations apply to 
many other regulated aspects of real estate, such as building dimensions and height.  At 
the same time, the exceptions to grandfathering also display a rough rationality.  
Requiring sewer hook-up, even by existing septic tank users, may make economic sense 
(connection costs are relatively low and long-term benefits may be substantial) and 
likewise installation of safety fencing and for removal of dangerous signs (costs are not 
great, the benefits of compliance are large, especially because they involve enhancement 
of personal safety).  
That the grandfathering that we observe is typically indefinite in duration also 
seems explainable.  The passage of time is not likely to change greatly the high cost of 
changing the location or physical characteristics of structures, or of lot size, nor is it 
likely to alter substantially the lower and often modest aesthetic benefits of compliance.  
(Note the contrast between this conclusion and the opinion discussed above that 
grandfathering of power plants should be of limited duration, because both the costs of 
noncompliance and the incremental benefits of compliance with pollution regulation rise 
over time.)  
  Finally, that modifications may result in loss of grandfathering status if their cost 
surpasses a threshold is understandable for the general reasons explained in the 
discussion in section 3.7.  For example, a major renovation of a home may provide an 
opportunity to cheaply bring wiring up to code requirements, since walls are likely to be 
opened up, electricians, carpenters, and painters are likely to be working on-site, and the 
like.  Of course, this is not to say that the percentage criterion cannot be improved, 
perhaps made dependent on the nature of the noncompliance.  Also, it is possible that 
when a modification is made, its expense should not be examined, but rather the direct 
approach should be pursued of estimating whether and how much the cost of compliance 
(like that of bringing wiring up to code) really does change as a consequence.  The 
problem with this direct approach is its administrative expensive in relation to that of use 
of the modification expenditure threshold, and thus it may well be inadvisable.  (Note 
again the contrast with the case of power plants, where incurring the administrative cost 
of the direct approach might be justified by the magnitude of the costs and the benefits of 
optimal regulation of each single power plant.)  
   
6.  Related Views and Literature  
  I comment here on the general notion that the law ought to be stable because it is 
relied upon, the literature concerning legal transitions, and economically-oriented writing 
on optimal legal rules.   
The view that the law should display stability, because parties rely upon the 
constancy of legal rules.  A frequently expressed view is that because parties rely in 
many ways on legal rules, the stability of legal rules is socially desirable.
65  The rationale 
                                                 
65 See again note 3 supra. 
  29given here for the stability of legal rules is consistent with this view.  As has been the 
major theme of this article, if parties rely on present legal rules and comply with them by 
making required durable investments (such as in smoke scrubbers), then it will often be 
socially desirable for their legal duties not to change.  The reason is that a change could 
be inefficient (a new smoke scrubber might cost more than the incremental gains it would 
achieve over the scrubber in place).  It follows that keeping the law fixed may be 
desirable if explicit grandfathering is not feasible, as was discussed in section 3.8.  In 
other words, stability of the law may be socially advantageous because it avoids forcing 
many parties to inefficiently alter the durable investments they had made in compliance 
with the law.   
The foregoing rationale for the stability of legal rules is not, however, the 
instrumental justification that I believe most of its proponents have in mind, which is that 
participation in activities would be undesirably chilled if legal standards might be raised 
in the future.
66  This argument is problematic.  It is true that participation in activities will 
be discouraged if there is a risk that legal standards would become more rigorous, but it is 
not true that this reduction in participation in activities is likely to be socially undesirable.  
As noted in section 3.9 and as is well understood, participation in potentially harmful 
activities tends to be socially excessive under a regime of legal standards (because parties 
do not have to pay for harm done given compliance with the standards).  Hence, although 
the level of participation in activities will be reduced if parties have to adhere to increases 
in legal standards, the level of participation will still be too great from a social 
perspective, assuming that the standards are properly chosen.
67
  Literature on legal transitions.  Beginning with Michael Graetz (1977), a 
literature has developed on whether legal relief from the burdens of legal change may be 
socially desirable to grant.
68 This “transitions” literature originally emphasized tax law, 
but reaches broader conclusions, especially in Louis Kaplow (1986), notably that 
grandfathering is a generally undesirable policy.
69  The nub of the argument made in the 
transitions literature against grandfathering is that it interferes directly with the social 
purposes of change in legal rules because by its nature it protects parties from having to 
obey socially desirable changes in rules.  Grandfathering is also thought to undermine 
social welfare indirectly because, if parties are shielded from future changes in legal 
rules, they will not be induced to plan their present actions keeping the possibility of 
                                                                                                                                                 
  
66 There is also a commonly encountered noninstrumental justification for the stability of law: 
individuals expect the law to be stable; it is undesirable per se to upset parties’ expectations; hence the law 
should be stable.  For this justification to apply, it must be explained why individuals expect the law to be 
stable, either in fact or in theory.  Thus, whatever may be its merits, the justification is incomplete.   
 
67 This is not meant to deny that if legal standards are revised without proper basis, parties’ 
motives to participate in activities could be undesirably dulled.   
 
68 See, e.g., Fisch (1997), Kaplow (1986), Kempler (1984), Levmore (1998, 1999), Logue (2003), 
Quinn and Trebilcock (1982), Shaviro (2000), and Troy (2000).   
 
69 Graetz (1977) at 68–73, 87, and Kaplow (1986) at 584–87.  There are many differences in 
position among these and other authors in the transitions literature on the demerits of grandfathering, but 
there is no need for me to distinguish them for my purposes.  
 
  30subsequent legal changes in mind.  The only potentially valid basis for grandfathering 
discussed in the transitions literature is as an implicit form of insurance against losses 
suffered when legal rules change.  But the literature argues that grandfathering would be 
an inefficient form of insurance and also that parties who desire insurance should seek to 
purchase it on private insurance markets.    
How can the negative conclusion about grandfathering in the transitions literature 
be reconciled with the conclusion developed here that grandfathering is often socially 
good?  The key to understanding the difference in conclusions is to note that the 
transitions literature does not distinguish between legal rules based on legal standards and 
rules based on strict liability.  Let me examine the criticisms of grandfathering made in 
transitions literature under each of these two major forms of legal rules.
70
In the case of rules based on legal standards, does grandfathering interfere directly 
with socially desirable legal change?  No, it does not, because, by the design of the 
regulators, grandfathering is granted to a party only when requiring the party to alter its 
behavior would be socially undesirable.  A firm will be grandfathered and permitted to 
continue using its old smoke scrubber only when switching to a better smoke scrubber 
would be socially undesirable (because the cost of the new scrubber would exceed the 
marginal benefit it would yield).  Conversely, a firm will not be grandfathered whenever 
the firm ought to replace its old smoke scrubber with a better one.  Hence, grandfathering 
does not result in direct interference with socially desirable changes in precaution, and 
grandfathering may be needed to prevent socially undesirable changes in precaution.  
Moreover, there will generally be many circumstances where changes in precautions are 
socially undesirable, and thus where grandfathering is called for, because of the durability 
of many precautions.
71  
Continuing, does grandfathering reduce social well-being indirectly, because it 
means that parties’ present behavior will fail to properly anticipate possible future 
changes in law?  Again, the answer is no.  In the first place, parties’ present behavior is 
by hypothesis regulated – it must satisfy a legal standard; it is not behavior that parties 
are free to choose and thus that could be influenced by anticipated future changes in law.  
The smoke scrubber that a firm installs today is not one that the firm is free to choose; in 
a regulated world, the scrubber must be of the type prescribed by the regulators.
72  
                                                 
70 I will not address the criticism concerning provision of implicit insurance as a rationale for 
grandfathering.  The reason is that issues of insurance have no relevance to the rationale for grandfathering 
that I have advanced in this article.  (However, I happen to agree that grandfathering should not be adopted 
in order to provide implicit insurance to those who would lose as a result of legal change.)  
 
71 In the transitions literature, it seems to be assumed, at least implicitly, that a change in a legal 
rule is socially desirable for all parties.  Here, as the reader knows, that is not assumed, and indeed the 
major question addressed is whether or not a legal change that is desirable for new entrants to an activity is 
desirable for those already engaging in the activity and complying with a past legal standard. 
  
72 Of course, in reality, the regulated world is more complicated than I just described it to be, and 
some dimensions of behavior affecting risk are not effectively controlled by regulation.  Grandfathering 
could affect decisions about such dimensions of behavior.  For example, as I explained in section 3.9, 
grandfathering might lead parties to enter into regulated activities more often than they otherwise would.  
However, such observations should not distract us from the central point under discussion that there can be 
no incentive effects of grandfathering on regulated dimensions of behavior because, by definition, they are 
controlled by the state.  
  31Furthermore, by the design of the regulators, present regulated behavior will in principle 
properly reflect all possible future changes in the world.  In the model that I examined, 
for example, the level of precautions chosen by the regulator to be the legal standard in 
period 1 impounds appropriately all possible future changes in harm in period 2.
73  
Now let us turn to rules based on strict liability.  Here the criticisms of 
grandfathering made in the transitions literature do apply.  That is, were parties protected 
against having to pay for changes in the harm that they might cause in the future, they 
might not take appropriate precautions later, and they might also take inadequate 
precautions today.   But these criticisms of grandfathering are of a piece with mine. 
Recall (see section 2.4) that I also said that grandfathering is undesirable under strict 
liability because grandfathering would dilute the level of precautions taken to alleviate 
the risk of harm.  
It is interesting to observe that the foregoing point, that grandfathering is 
undesirable when liability is strict, bears on the evaluation of grandfathering in the area 
of taxation, to which the transitions literature was initially directed.  In that domain, there 
is good reason to think that grandfathering is socially undesirable, because taxes often 
have strict liability aspects.  To illustrate where this is almost literally true, suppose that a 
tax rule is designed to reduce pollution and that the tax is set equal to the expected harm 
caused by polluting activities.  If new information emerges indicating that pollution is 
more harmful than had been thought, one can readily show that it is socially desirable for 
the tax to be increased commensurately, so that, in particular, there should be no 
grandfathering in the form of retention of the old, lower tax for parties who had been 
paying only that.  Of course, many taxes have a purpose different from a corrective 
pollution tax and are designed to raise revenue, but I believe that arguments similar to 
those applying under strict liability would frequently be valid with respect to them. 
To conclude, my assessment of the transitions literature is that its fundamental 
criticisms of grandfathering have relevance mainly in the context of strict liability and 
probably also of taxation.  In the domain of law governed by legal standards, the 
criticisms of the transitions literature are misplaced.  In that domain, which comprises the 
great majority of our legal rules, the benchmark for thinking should be that 
grandfathering is sometimes socially desirable, for the reasons elaborated in the analysis 
of this article. 
Economically-oriented literature on legal rules.  There exists, of course, a well-
developed economic literature on optimal behavior to prevent harm and the inducement 
of that behavior through the use of legal rules.  This literature generally views parties as 
choosing precautions on a blank slate – past behavior is not considered.
74  Hence, what 
the present article contributes to economic analysis of legal rules and optimal behavior is 
                                                 
 
73 In section 2.3 I explain informally how optimal precaution in period 1 depends on the array of 
possible outcomes in period 2, and in section 4.2 I explain this formally.  In particular, condition (3) of 
section 4.2 determines the optimal level of durable precaution x1* in period 1, and this condition involves 
the entire distribution of possible future harms through the terms E(h), Pr(I(x1)), and E(h|I(x1)). 
74  The paradigm for the use of legal rules to channel behavior desirably is that developed in the 
literature on the economics of tort law, on which see generally Calabresi (1970), Landes and Posner (1987), 
and Shavell (1987); these sources do not take past behavior into account in discussing later optimal 
behavior.  Likewise, recent surveys of the economics of liability omit mention of the relevance of past 
behavior to subsequent optimal behavior; see, e.g., Brown (1998). 
  32the examination of the influence of past behavior on presently optimal behavior and the 
implications of this dependence for the design of legal rules.  
 
7.  Conclusion 
  I have considered here the general question whether, and how, legal rules should 
change in the light of new circumstances and conditions.  The main point of emphasis has 
been that the steps that it is socially desirable for parties to take depend on their past 
actions when those actions have durable aspects.  This gave rise to the conclusion that it 
is often undesirable for parties to make changes, even though a new entrant into a 
regulated activity ought to take previously unrequired actions.  And what flowed from 
that conclusion was that grandfathering may be desirable, or else, if grandfathering is 
infeasible, that it may be best for legal duties not to be altered.  
  The issues addressed here seem to me to be important to a consideration of legal 
change because of my empirical judgment that much of our behavior that is regulated by 
law displays significant durable aspects.  Hence, explicit recognition of that point in the 
analysis of legal change should be included in our intellectual agenda.   
Also, one hopes, the analysis offered here may help to clarify thinking and 
possibly to offer guidance to policymakers and courts.  In this regard, I suggested that 
legal authorities could improve the rules determining whether modifications result in loss 
of grandfathered status under the Clean Air Act.  Moreover, legal authorities could avoid 
the whole task of policing modifications and grandfathering by adopting the rule of strict 
liability or by employing pollution taxes.  As I explained, under this type of rule, legal 
authorities eliminate in a fell swoop the entire need to consider past behavior in their 
decisions; private actors themselves are induced to take their past behavior into proper 
account with no oversight from without.  
Last, let me comment on the positive aspect of the analysis of this article.  I have 
suggested that the fact that we observe grandfathering, and more generally, a certain 
measure of stability in the law, is in substantial respects explained by the central point of 
the analysis here, namely, that the expense of legal change may not be worth the 
incremental benefits over what society obtains from past compliance with legal rules.  
What I have not examined, however, is doubtless a significant part of the explanation for 
grandfathering.  Namely, grandfathering is in the selfish interest of incumbents in an 
activity, especially of firms in an industry, and allows them to benefit without appearing 
to stand in the way of legal change.  Quite apart from the social desirability that 
grandfathering may possess, then, grandfathering enjoys a type of political and economic 
appeal for incumbents that may help to explain why we have as much grandfathering as 
we do, and perhaps too much.   
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